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Abstract 
Theory predicts democracy should reduce corruption.  Yet, numerous scholars have found 
empirically that corruption decreases at high levels of democracy but actually increases at low 
levels.  A key weaknesses of studies that aim to explain this inverted curvilinear relationship, 
however, is that they do not disaggregate the complex concept of democracy.  By contrast, this 
working paper disaggregates democracy theoretically and empirically.  Our theoretical framework 
shows how components of democracy affect costs and benefits of engaging in corruption and, 
therefore, the level of corruption overall.  Whereas other studies examine only how democratic 
accountability imposes costs on those engaging in corruption and thus illuminate only the 
downward curve of the relationship, we also examine the transaction costs and political support 
benefits of corruption and therefore can explain the initial uptick in corruption at low levels of 
democracy.  Using measures of democratic components from Varieties of Democracy, we 
examine 173 countries from 1900 to 2012 and find that freedoms of expression and association 
exhibit the inverted curvilinear relationship with corruption, and that judicial constraints have a 
negative linear relationship. Moreover, the introduction of elections and the quality of elections 
act jointly, but each in a linear fashion. The mere introduction of elections increases corruption, 
thus accounting for the upward sloping segment of the inverted curve.  Once the quality of 
elections begins to improve, corruption decreases, resulting in the downward-sloping segment of 
the curve.    
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Introduction 
Democracy, or responsive government, should in theory also mean less corrupt government. 
Initial statistical research provided support for this idea, finding a negative linear relationship 
between democracy and corruption.2 Subsequent research, however, revealed a more 
complicated relationship. Scholars have found that while very high levels of democracy reduce 
corruption, low to modest levels of democracy actually increase corruption.3 In other words, 
there is an inverted curvilinear relationship, rather than a negative linear one, between corruption 
and democracy.  
Competing explanations for the curvilinear relationship populate the field. Montinola 
and Jackman question whether this relationship actually exists, worrying that it merely “may 
reflect the increase in information and reporting of corruption that typically accompanies 
democratization”.4 Other scholars accept the paradox and seek to explain it. Focusing on 
bureaucratic corruption (“state administrative capacity”), Bäck and Hadenius argue that the 
infusion of freedom accompanying democratization initially increases corruption because 
authoritarian controls “from above” dissolve without comprehensive democratic checks on 
officials’ behavior “from below” such as electoral participation and public access to 
information.5 Charron and Lapuente contend that the curvilinearity stems from an interaction 
effect between GDP per capita (which drives citizens’ demand for quality of government, the 
specific outcome variable they consider) and democracy (which drives the supply of leaders 
willing to enact non-corruption reforms). Their conclusion is that we should expect democracy 
to decrease corruption but only in rich countries.6 Related to this puzzle of curvilinearity, Keefer 
explains that young democracies exhibit more corruption than old democracies because political 
candidates in the former rely on clientelism to compensate for their inability to make credible 
preelectoral promises.7 
One key weakness of studies that aim to explain the curvilinear relationship is that few 
disaggregate the complex concept of democracy. Theoretically, authors identify conditions in 
democratic regimes that cultivate or hinder corruption, always defining democracy broadly (e.g., 
“political democracy in a liberal sense” in Back and Hadenius 2008).8 Empirically, there is also a 
lack of disaggregation, as most scholars rely on composite indices of democracy rather than 
                                                
2 Goldsmith 1999, Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, Treisman 2000. 
3 Bäck and Hadenius 2008, Charron and Lapuente 2010, Montinola and Jackman 2002, Sung 2004. 
4 Montinola and Jackman 2002, 163. 
5 Bäck and Hadenius 2008. 
6 Charron and Lapuente 2010. 
7 Keefer 2007. 
8 Bäck and Hadenius 2008. 
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indicators of individual democratic institutions or features (e.g., Back and Hadenius 2008, 
Charron and Lapuente 2010 use a combination of Freedom House and Polity scores).9  A 
different set of studies does disaggregate democracy, but each examines only one or two 
components of democracy and does not seek to explain the overall curvilinear relationship.10 
Moreover, this research emphasizes how certain democracy components expand accountability 
of officials to the public and each other and thus increase the costs of engaging in corruption. 
The problem is that this explains only the decrease, not the increase, found in the curvilinear 
relationship between democracy and corruption. The literature can thus explain why democracy 
eventually curbs corruption, but not why an initial shift from autocracy to democracy seems to 
foster it. In brief, we lack research that unpacks democracy in order understand the mechanisms 
underpinning the curvilinear relationship between democracy and corruption. 
This paper disaggregates democracy theoretically, methodologically, and empirically in 
order to explain how democracy might initially increase but subsequently decrease corruption. 
Our theoretical framework describes how specific components of democracy influence 
individuals’ calculations about the costs and benefits of corruption and thus help determine 
corruption levels in countries. Though a large body of work has examined the decision to engage 
in corruption as a cost-benefit calculation, 11 the innovation of this paper is to use a cost-benefit 
framework to explain how democracy components increase and then decrease corruption levels. 
Specifically, the existence of some freedom of association and freedom of expression reduce 
corruption transaction costs, and the introduction of elections means corruption has the 
appealing benefit to officials of securing funding to shore up their political support. Together, 
then, a small increase in democracy reduces the transactions costs and increases the benefits of 
corruption. As others have shown, only at middle to high levels of democracy do democratic 
accountability relationships truly flourish, increasing the costs and risks of corruption sufficiently 
that corruption becomes less appealing. 
We use the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset to disaggregate the concept of 
democracy empirically and time-series, cross-sectional regression analysis to test hypotheses 
about the disaggregated relationships. The analysis corroborates nearly all of our expectations.12 
We find that, collectively, certain components of democracy—the presence of elections, 
combined with whether they are free and fair, and freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and judicial constraints—drive the curvilinear relationship between democracy and 
                                                
9 Bäck and Hadenius 2008, Charron and Lapuente 2010. 
10 For example, Adserá, et al. 2003, Brunetti and Weder 2003. 
11 For example, Becker and Stigler 1974, Klitgaard 1988, Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001. 
12 Coppedge, et al. 2016c. 
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corruption, whereas, unexpectedly, the legislative constraints do not seem to contribute. Of 
those components that do contribute, freedom of expression and freedom of association exhibit 
a curvilinear relationship with corruption and judicial constraints have a negative relationship. By 
contrast, the introduction of elections and the quality of elections act jointly, but each in a linear 
fashion. The mere introduction of elections (regardless of nature and quality) unambiguously 
increases corruption, thus accounting for the upward sloping segment of the inverted curve. 
Then, once the quality of elections begins to improve, corruption decreases, resulting in the 
downward-sloping segment of the curve.  
The paper proceeds by first laying out the theoretical framework and our hypotheses. 
The next section describes the data and methods. We then turn to confirming that the 
curvilinear relationship found by other scholars is evident from the V-Dem data. The next 
sections test, first, alternative explanations then our hypotheses. The final section reviews our 
findings and considers their implications. 
 
I. Theoretical Framework   
We theorize that different components of democracy and levels of corruption are connected 
through individuals’ calculations about the costs and benefits of engaging in corruption. The 
emergence or strengthening of specific components of democracy affects the costs or benefits 
of corrupt acts. Whereas earlier works have examined the costs and benefits of corruption with 
respect to individual decision-making,13 we argue that these individual decisions constitute cost-
benefit dynamics, and ultimately, the extent of corruption in a country.  
We employ the standard definition of corruption— the use of public office for private 
gain. This includes heads of government and state, cabinet ministers, legislators, judges, and 
bureaucrats stealing, embezzling or misappropriating public funds or other state resources for 
personal or family use and granting favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material 
inducements. Note that our definition excludes electoral irregularities, such as vote-buying and 
ballot-stuffing, which do not necessarily involve public officials or private gain.14  
We consider six components of democracy:  the existence of elections, the quality of 
elections, judicial constraints on the executive, legislative constraints on the executive, freedom 
of expression, and freedom of association. These components of democracy affect three costs 
                                                
13 For example, Becker and Stigler 1974, Klitgaard 1988, Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001. 
14 Also see Keefer 2007 for more on the curvilinear relationship between democracy and clientelism. Our theoretical 
conceptualization of corruption is slightly different than some others used in the literature examining democracy 
and corruption, such as Back and Hadenius’ 2008 focus on bureaucratic corruption, or Charron and Lapuente’s 
2010 focus on the quality of government. 
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and benefits of engaging in corruption, specifically accountability costs, transaction costs, and 
political support benefits.  
With respect to accountability costs, democracy components establish three different 
types of accountability.15  The existence of competitive and fair elections allows citizens to 
reward and punish leaders for their actions in office,16 known as vertical accountability. 
Legislative and judicial constraints on the executive—in the form of self-confident, independent, 
and capacitated legislatures and high courts with the power to monitor and sanction the 
executive—create horizontal accountability. 17  Freedom of expression and freedom of 
association promote an active and free media and civil society, which facilitate both informed 
selection by elections and checks and balances between institutions and thus create societal 
accountability.18  
As democratic components furthering accountability become more effective, the costs of 
engaging in corruption increase: illicit behavior is more likely to be discovered and punished and 
thus the level of corruption decreases. This cannot, however, account for the greater amount of 
corruption at low to middle levels of democracy relative to no democracy. Studies of corruption 
that focus exclusively on accountability thus cannot explain the curvilinear relationship.  
By including transaction costs and political support benefits of corruption, our 
framework accounts for the greater amount of corruption at low to middle levels of democracy. 
First, when democratic components are introduced, but are not strong enough to ensure 
effective accountability, they can increase corruption by reducing the transaction costs of 
engaging in illicit activities. Specifically, when freedom of expression and freedom of association 
are introduced, but are weak, co-conspirators can more readily identify each other and organize. 
This allows co-conspirators to develop and execute corruption schemes more easily. In addition, 
the emergence of some information, in the absence of high levels of transparency (e.g., about 
government contracts or anticipated government programs), increases opportunities for rent-
seeking.19  These lowered transaction costs facilitate corruption by government executives, 
legislators, judges, and bureaucrats; officials may collaborate in schemes or work independently 
with members of the public. In such a situation, freedom of expression and freedom of 
association are not yet strong enough to ensure accountability. Whereas the corruption literature 
has examined the cost of losing office, it has focused little attention on this other cost—the 
transaction costs of corruption.  
                                                
15 Lindberg, et al. 2017. 
16 For example, Dahl 1971. 
17 For example, Karl and Schmitter 1991, Laver and Shepsle 1999, O'Donnell 1998. 
18 For example, Schedler 1999, Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000. 
19 Bac 2001, Hollyer, et al. 2011. 
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Then, as freedom of expression and freedom of association increase, a well-organized 
corruption network is offset by accountability mechanisms and declining opportunities for rent-
seeking. Access to information, through the media and civil society, provides societal 
accountability and facilitates vertical accountability. Media freedom and media access provide 
citizens with information about corrupt acts and viable avenues for reporting and punishing 
corruption.20 This information can also be passed from person to person or through civil society 
when freedom of expression is high, and freedom of association provides greater potential for 
facilitating collective action in reaction to knowledge about corruption. Societal accountability 
discourages corruption among government executives, legislators, judges, and bureaucrats, and 
vertical accountability deters those who are elected from engaging in corruption. The free flow 
of information finally reduces officials’ and bureaucrats’ ability to use or sell information for 
personal gain.21  Societal accountability discourages corruption among government executives, 
legislators, judges, and bureaucrats, and vertical accountability deters those who are elected from 
engaging in corruption. 
From this discussion of how democracy components through accountability and 
transaction costs and transactions benefits affect corruption levels, we derive our first four 
hypotheses. Because freedom of expression and freedom of association, at their weakest, reduce 
transactions costs of engaging in corruption and, at their strongest, increase accountability costs 
of engaging in corruption, we hypothesize,  
  
H1: There is a curvilinear relationship between freedom of expression and corruption.  
 
H2: There is a curvilinear relationship between the freedom of association and 
corruption.  
  
Our theoretical framework suggests that legislative and judicial constraints would 
provide horizontal accountability and increases the transaction costs of corruption. Specifically, 
judiciaries and legislatures are internal monitors and constraints on the behavior of officials and 
bureaucrats to help ensure that they do not abuse their offices.22 The separation of powers also 
tends to reduce opportunities for personal gain by increasing the number of players who would 
have to be involved, thus making deals more complicated and costly for the parties in the 
                                                
20 Adserá, et al. 2003, Lederman, et al. 2005, Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000. 
21 Adsera et al. 2003, Kolstad and Wiig 2011, Brunetti and Weder 2003.  
22 Rose-Ackerman 1996.  
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corrupt exchange.23  As a result, the level of illicit activity in the judiciary and legislature 
decreases as judges and legislators independently monitor the executive and bureaucrats rather 
than collude in corruption. The level of executive corruption falls as legislative and judicial 
constraints on the executive effectively act as a deterrent to corruption. These constraints reduce 
overall corruption by having an impact on legislative, judicial, executive, but likely not 
bureaucratic, corruption. So, we hypothesize that 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between judicial constraints on the executive and 
corruption.  
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between legislative constraints on the executive and 
corruption.  
 
The benefit of political support is also important to consider because, like transaction 
costs, it contributes to the increase in corruption found in the curvilinear relationship. The 
introduction of elections, regardless of how free and fair they are, motivates government officials 
to engage in illicit activities to raise funds for garnering political support.  By transferring public 
funds and other state resources and grant favors to those whose loyalty they need, autocrats can 
reduce the threat posed by elections. Even when election “results” are controlled from above, 
the electoral process can serve as rallying points for the disgruntled and can spark revolutions 
that oust incumbents.24 When leaders’ control of elections is imperfect, they can suffer actual 
electoral defeat. In either case, they have an incentive to transfer public funds and state resources 
and to grant favors to potential and current supporters in order to help them maintain their 
positions. This is most apt for officials whose positions are newly subject to elections but the 
uncertainty of a new selection process for some officials can encourage even non-elected ones to 
shore up their political support. Political support manifests itself, most broadly, in inaction, that 
is in not initiating insurgencies, not carrying out coups, and not using one’s executive, legislative, 
or judicial authority to remove someone from power, for example.25  Following from this logic, 
we propose a fifth hypothesis,  
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between holding elections and corruption. 
                                                
23 Kolstad and Wiig 2016, Rose-Ackerman 1996. 
24 Kuntz and Thompson 2009, Tucker 2007. 
25 As noted above, our focus is not electoral corruption and thus our understanding of political support is broader 
than vote-buying. 
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When elections not only exist, but are increasingly free and fair, the vertical accountability 
mechanism work more effectively, counteracting the political support benefit of corruption. In 
free and fair elections, voters are better able, than in noncompetitive, manipulated elections, to 
hold corrupt officials accountable for their actions by removing them from office and not re-
electing corrupt officials.26 Those who have been engaging in illicit activities to shore up their 
positions are held accountable for doing so. Because of these costs, political leaders tend to 
eschew corrupt practices in order to remain in office and more readily punish their peers or 
bureaucrats who engage in corrupt activities.27 For these reasons, we include a sixth, and final, 
hypothesis, 
  
H6: There is a negative relationship between the quality of elections and corruption. 
 
When the relationships described in H5 and H6 are combined, a curvilinear relationship 
should be revealed. 
The inclusion of the benefits of political support underscores, as our empirical results show, 
that it is not just bureaucrats, but also top government officials, who contribute to the increase 
in corruption. By contrast, Bäck and Hadenius attribute the increase to the weakening of 
authoritarian controls from above.28 But, their explanation accounts for only an increase in 
bureaucratic corruption. By considering the value of corruption to political support, our 
framework also accounts for why top government leaders engage in more corruption as 
components of democracy emerge.  
 
II. Data and Methods 
To test our hypotheses regarding the relationship between democracy and corruption, we use 
the V-Dem dataset, which provides data for 173 countries from 1900 to 2012.29 This provides a 
longer time-series and greater number of disaggregated data points to study this relationship 
than datasets used in earlier corruption studies. The indices we create and use are comprised of 
V-Dem expert-coded indicators. For each indicator, V-Dem enlists a minimum of five experts 
per country-year with documented expertise in the particular area. A customized measurement 
                                                
26 Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986, Kolstad and Wiig 2016. 
27 Adserá, et al. 2003, Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000. 
28 Bäck and Hadenius 2008. 
29 Version 6.2. Coppedge, et al. 2016a. 
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model using Bayesian ordinal item response theory aggregates these responses into one 
indicator-country-year observation. The measurement model weights each coder by a reliability 
parameter, determined by the coder’s level of agreement with other country coders.30    
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in all hypotheses is corruption, which we operationalize by combining 
six V-Dem indicators—executive bribery, executive embezzlement, public sector bribery, public 
sector embezzlement, legislative corruption, and judicial corruption—into Corruption Index.31 
Summary statistics for all variables appear in Table 1 of the supplemental appendix. More details 
about this index and the other variables used in this paper can be found in the appendix at the 
end of the paper and the V-Dem Codebook.32 An extensive discussion regarding the validity of 
the V-Dem corruption index can be found in Strategies of Validation: Assessing the Varieties of 
Democracy Corruption Data.33 
 
Independent Variables  
To validate that the curvilinear relationship found by other studies using different data is 
replicated using the V-Dem dataset, we measure democracy using V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy 
index.34  
To test H1 and H2, we employ two V-Dem indices. Freedom of Expression is an index 
formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for 
print/broadcast censorship effort, internet censorship effort, harassment of journalists, media 
bias, media self-censorship, the level of critical discourse in print/broadcast media, the balance 
in perspectives in print/broadcast media, freedom of discussion for men/women, and freedom 
of academic and cultural expression. This operationalization of freedom of expression aligns 
with our theory that both information availability and information neutrality are necessary in 
order to have high freedom of expression. Freedom of Association is an index formed by taking the 
point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban, barriers to 
parties, opposition party autonomy, elections multiparty, CSO entry and exit, and CSO 
repression. Reflecting the role that freedom association plays in determining both transaction 
                                                
30 Coppedge, et al. 2016b, Pemstein, et al. 2015. 
31 As legislative corruption data are missing for countries lacking legislatures, we take the average of public sector 
corruption, executive corruption, and judicial corruption to create the corruption index in these cases. McMann, et 
al. 2016. 
32 Coppedge, et al. 2016a. 
33 McMann, et al. 2016. 
34 For more discussion about the V-Dem democracy indices, see Teorell, et al. 2016. 
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costs and risks of detection and punishment, this index takes into account the organizational 
costs for forming parties and CSOs as well as any ongoing barriers to operation that might 
hinder an environment of accountability. 
To test H3 and H4, we use two more indices from V-Dem. Judicial Constraints on Executive 
is an index formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the 
indicators for executive respects constitution, compliance with judiciary, compliance with high 
court, high court independence, and lower court independence. Legislative Constraints on Executive 
is an index formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the 
indicators for legislature questions officials in practice, executive oversight, legislature 
investigates in practice, and legislature opposition parties. Each of these indices captures 
multiple mechanisms of horizontal accountability that might limit corruption. 
For H5 and H6, we analyze two variables tapping into different aspects of the theory. 
The variable Electoral Regime is a binary indicator for whether or not a country has introduced 
elections, and provides an independent variable for H5. Reduced Free and Fair Elections is an index 
formed by taking the point estimates from a principal components factor analysis model of the 
indicators for election management body (EMB) autonomy, EMB capacity, voter registry, other 
voting irregularities, election government intimidation, electoral violence, and whether or not the 
election was generally free and fair. Departing from the higher-level free and fair elections index 
produced in V-Dem, we exclude vote buying, as other scholars have considered vote buying to 
be an alternative measure of corruption or have considered it to be one specific form of 
corruption.35 
 
Control Variables   
We consider a broad set of control variables known to affect the relationship between 
democracy and corruption. As an overview of all control variables, we provide a diagram, Figure 
1, in the supplemental appendix. 
We control for three time-invariant factors with country-fixed effects.36 British colonial 
heritage and Protestantism are often found to be associated with higher levels of democracy and 
lower levels of corruption.37 By contrast, ethnic heterogeneity is typically correlated with lower 
                                                
35 See, respectively, Keefer 2007, Van Ham and Lindberg 2016. 
36 Protestantism and ethnic heterogeneity are time-invariant in most datasets, including in V-Dem, though they are 
not time-invariant theoretically. 
37 Gerring and Thacker 2005, Lipset and Lenz 2000, Treisman 2007. 
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levels of democracy and higher levels of corruption.38 We also control for year-specific effects 
using year-fixed effects. 
We consider two political control variables, which are both time-variant. In all of our 
regressions, we control for the number of years a country has been a democracy (Stock of 
Democracy). This allows us to separate the effect of accountability levels from the effect, simply, 
of becoming more experienced with democracy, as countries more experienced with democracy 
may be better able to utilize democratic accountability mechanisms. State capacity is a potential 
confound because it could affect both corruption levels and the potential for democracy in a 
society.39 To control for State Capacity, we use the Hansen and Sigman state capacity index, the 
most expansive dataset on state capacity that is available.40 The coverage of this dataset is still 
limited, so we do not include state capacity in our main analyses. However, Table 2 of the 
supplemental appendix includes robustness checks with state capacity included.41  
Finally, we include three economic controls, all of which are time-variant. Income (GDP 
per Capita), income equality (GINI Coefficient), and Trade Openness have each been shown to have a 
positive relationship with level of democracy and a negative one with corruption.42 As with the 
state capacity data, data on GDP per capita, inequality, and trade openness are not available for 
the expansive number of countries and years for which we have V-Dem data. However, we run 
our analyses in Table 2 of the supplemental appendix with all three of these economic control 
variables included.  
Because many of the control variables often come from sparser datasets the effect of 
democracy components on corruption often disappears when we include control variables. 
However, when we use the same sample, but without the control variables, the lack of significant 
findings persists, which tells us that the reduction in observations is driving the loss of 
significance, and not the inclusion of controls. All of these robustness checks can be found in 
Table 2 of the supplemental appendix. 
 
Modelling Strategy 
All regressions include two lags of the dependent variable (to purge the residuals due to serial 
autocorrelation), year- and country- fixed effects, and clustered standard errors at the country 
                                                
38 Cornwell 1964, Huntington 2002, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007. 
39 Klitgaard 1988, Rose-Ackerman 1999. 
40 Hanson and Sigman 2013. 
41 We would like to control for the effect of trust, which has been shown to affect both democracy and corruption 
levels in societies (Bjørnskov and Paldam 2005; Morris and Klesner 2010). However, there are not adequate time-
series, cross-national data on trust available for inclusion in our analysis. 
42 Ades and Di Tella 1999, Gerring and Thacker 2005, Sandholtz and Gray 2003, Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000. 
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level. We replicate our findings without five outlier cases in Table 3 in the supplemental 
appendix, and the results are robust to their exclusion. 
 Due to the high level of serial autocorrelation, short-run (one-year lagged) effects of 
democracy components on corruption appear substantively insignificant, even if statistically 
significant. As corruption is a sticky phenomenon, the effect of democracy on corruption levels 
should be expected to be felt primarily over a long-term period. To capture this idea and depict 
the long-run effects visually, we calculate the long-run effects by aggregating the effect of the 
independent variable in question over time.  
 
III. The Curvilinear Relationship  
Prior to testing our hypotheses, we validate the presence of a curvilinear relationship between 
democracy and corruption in the V-Dem data. Prior research has provided evidence of three 
curvilinear relationships. Scholars have found an inverted U-shaped curve, where corruption 
levels are low in the most authoritarian and the most democratic states; an inverted J-shaped 
curve, where corruption levels are the lowest in the most democratic states; or an S-shaped 
curve, where there is an initial drop in corruption with liberalization in the most authoritarian 
countries.43  It is important to note that J- and U-shaped relationships are statistically identical—
both have a significant squared term. The only difference is whether the y-intercept it located 
close to the right-most expected value, where x it at its maximum. The theoretical and 
substantive difference between the J- and U-shaped curves are minimal:  what is key is that the 
relationship is non-monotonic. The previous finding of an S-shaped curve by one scholar is 
problematic substantively as there is no compelling theory, including our own, as to why we 
would expect an S curve. 
The V-Dem data show a strong inverted J-shaped relationship between corruption and 
democracy (Figure 1). Corruption increases as democracy increases from 0 to approximately 0.5 
(on a scale of 0 to 1), what would be a hybrid regime displaying some weak components of 
democracy. From 0.5 to 1, increases in democracy are associated with decreases in corruption. In 
Table 1 we take further steps to test the robustness of this relationship and find that it remains. 
First, we introduce controls for serial dependence and potential backwards causality by 
introduction lagged dependent variables and lagged democracy variables, as well as controlling 
for possible global co-trending of democracy and corruption by introducing year-fixed effects 
(Model 1). Next, to further reduce threats to inference from omitted variable bias, we exclusively 
                                                
43 For example, see, respectively, Bäck and Hadenius 2008, Montinola and Jackman 2002, Sung 2004. 
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restrict attention to within-country variation by also incorporating country-fixed effects (Model 
2). The relationship also remains largely unchanged when outliers are removed, as demonstrated 
in Table 3 in the supplemental appendix.  
 
 
Figure 1: Scatter Plot of Democracy and Corruption 
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Table 1: Relationship between Corruption and Electoral Democracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Corr. Index 
Corr. 
Index 
Corr. 
Index 
Corr. 
Index Exec. Corr. 
Corruption Index, Lagged (1 
Year) 
1.0513*** 1.0344*** 1.0365*** 1.0366***  
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0168) (0.0168)  
Corruption Index, Lagged (2 
Years) 
-0.0615*** -0.0628*** -0.0812*** -0.0810***  
(0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0160) (0.0160)  
Executive Corruption, Lagged 
(1 Year) 
    1.0449*** 
    (0.0166) 
Executive Corruption, Lagged 
(2 Years) 
    -0.0974*** 
    (0.0162) 
Electoral Democracy Lagged (1 
Year) 
0.0144*** 0.0327*** 0.0136* 0.0147* 0.0210** 
(0.0031) (0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0099) 
Electoral Democracy ^2 -0.0230
*** -0.0344*** -0.0257*** -0.0275*** -0.0385*** 
(0.0036) (0.0059) (0.0088) (0.0092) (0.0120) 
Stock of Democracy, Lagged (1 
Year) 
  0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0025*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
GDP Per Capita, Lagged (1 
Year) 
  -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0009* 
  (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
GDP Per Capita x Electoral 
Democracy 
   0.0002 0.0009 
   (0.0004) (0.0005) 
R2 0.9882 0.9538 0.9324 0.9324 0.9117 
No. Countries 173 173 154 154 154 
Avg. Years per Country 91.4 91.4 66.3 66.3 66.3 
No. Observations 15818 15818 10208 10208 10208 
Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors clustered on countries, in parentheses. Country- and year-
fixed effects included in regressions but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
We do not find evidence of an S-curve. Using a third-order functional form, Sung finds a 
S-shaped relationship between democracy and corruption, in that there are negative coefficients 
on the linear, squared, and cubic terms.44 When we use a cubic functional form, we find a 
positive linear, negative squared, and positive cubic terms. These results are available in Table 4 
of the supplemental appendix. 
In sum, the V-Dem data generate a curve similar to most of the literature, which has 
found either an inverted J- or U- curve. We consistently find an inverted J-curve, which again is 
nearly identical statistically to the inverted U-curve. 
 
  
                                                
44 Sung 2004. 
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IV. Alternative Explanations 
While we examine the same puzzling curve as much of the literature, our explanation is 
different. Before testing the hypotheses derived from our theoretical framework, we test 
alternative explanations using V-Dem data. First we control for Stock of Democracy and GDP per 
Capita (Model 3, Table 1 above). The results refute the notion, implied by Treisman and Keefer, 
that the curvilinear relationship between democracy and corruption might be driven by the 
relationship between a country’s experience with democracy and its level of corruption.45 As can 
be seen, even after controlling for Stock of Democracy, the curvilinear relationship still holds, and 
the coefficient for Stock of Democracy is not in the expected direction: it is positive, implying that 
more experience with democracy, all else equal, actually leads to increases in corruption.  
In Model 4, we also refute Charron and Laupente’s argument that the curvilinear 
relationship is produced by an interaction effect between GDP and (electoral) democracy.46 
Though they are considering the broader outcome variable of “Quality of Government,” rather 
than corruption, it is nonetheless compelling to note the statistically insignificant coefficient on 
the GDP per Capita*Electoral Democracy interaction term.  
Finally, in Model 5, we examine the implication of Bäck and Hadenius’ argument that 
public sector corruption drives the relationship between democracy and corruption.47 Even 
when excluding public sector corruption from the dependent variable and focusing on only 
corruption in the executive, Executive Corruption, the effect holds. 
 
V. Results 
Unable to account for the inverted J-curve relationship between corruption and democracy with 
existing explanations, we turn to our hypotheses. First, our theoretical framework predicts that 
the inverted J-shaped relationship should be present when considering the effect of Freedom of 
Expression and Freedom of Association on corruption (H1 and H2, respectively). We find strong 
support for both of these hypotheses. In both Model 1 and Model 2 of Table 2, there is a 
significant and positive coefficient on the linear term and a significant and negative coefficient 
on the squared term. 
  
                                                
45 Keefer 2007, Treisman 2007. 
46 Charron and Lapuente 2010. 
47 Bäck and Hadenius 2008. 
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Table 2: Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Association, and Corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (1 Year) 1.0345*** 1.0347*** 1.0022*** 
(0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0183) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (2 Years) -0.0615*** -0.0611*** -0.0776*** 
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0155) 
Freedom of Expression, Lagged (1 Year) 0.0217***  0.0243* 
(0.0061)  (0.0132) 
Freedom of Expression^2 -0.0230***  -0.00567* 
(0.0063)  (0.0132) 
Media Freedom, Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle   -0.0057*** 
   (0.0019) 
Freedom of Association, Lagged (1 Year)  0.0262***  
 (0.0059)  
Freedom of Association^2  -0.0256***  
 (0.0062)  
R2 0.9534 0.9538 0.9044 
No. Countries 173 173 168 
Avg. Years per Country 89.7 91.4 51.2 
No. Observations 15521 15818 8604 
Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors clustered on countries, in parentheses. Country- and year-
fixed effects included in regressions but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
However, it is reasonable to be cautious when interpreting our finding on Freedom of 
Expression. As Montinola and Jackman point out, any positive relationship between democracy 
and corruption “may reflect the increase in information and reporting of corruption that 
typically accompanies democratization.”48 As the V-Dem Freedom of Expression index includes 
several indicators that pertain to the availability of information in the media, one might be 
concerned that this index is serving as a proxy indicator for the attention the issue of corruption 
is getting in the media. Accordingly, we acknowledge that the results regarding freedom of 
expression presented in Table 2 may demonstrate a curvilinear relationship between freedom of 
expression and corruption, or alternatively, may demonstrate simply that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between media attention on corruption and expert coder ratings of corruption. 
However, there are two reasons we believe the results on freedom of expression support our 
hypothesis. First, the concern that Montinola and Jackman point to implies a positive, linear 
relationship between media attention on corruption and coder perceptions, and what we find is a 
curvilinear relationship implying that after a certain threshold freedom of expression does hurt 
corruption.49 Second, when we include a measure of media freedom from outside the V-Dem 
dataset, Media Freedom from Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle, as a control variable capturing 
                                                
48 Montinola and Jackman 2002, 163. 
49 Montinola and Jackman 2002. 
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specifically changes in media scrutiny, the relationship between freedom of expression and 
corruption holds (Model 3).  
In Table 3, we turn to our tests of H3 and H4 examining the relationships between 
judicial and legislative constraints, respectively, and corruption. In these models, we control for 
the Electoral Democracy and its squared term, so as to isolate the horizontal accountability 
mechanism from the vertical accountability mechanism. Model 1 shows that Judicial Constraints on 
Executive negatively impacts corruption, supporting H3. However, failing to support H4, Model 2 
shows no significant effect for Legislative Constraints on Executive.  
 
Table 3: Judicial and Legislative Constraints on the Executive and Corruption 
 (1) (2) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (1 Year) 1.0307*** 1.0191*** 
(0.0149) (0.0162) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (2 Years) -0.0622*** -0.0632*** 
(0.0150) (0.0155) 
Electoral Democracy, Lagged (1 Year) 0.0386*** 0.0315*** 
(0.0062) (0.0076) 
Electoral Democracy^2 -0.0425*** -0.0395*** 
(0.0063) (0.0078) 
Judicial Constraints on Executive, Lagged (1 Year) -0.0074**  
(0.0032)  
Legislative Constraints on Executive, Lagged (1 Year)  -0.0046 
 (0.0033) 
R2 0.9539 0.9354 
No. Countries 173 172 
Avg. Years per Country 94.4 74.6 
No. Observations 15818 12830 
Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors clustered on countries, in parentheses. Country- and year-
fixed effects included in regressions but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Finally, we test our hypotheses regarding the effect of electoral mechanisms, H5 and H6. 
We start in Model 1 in Table 4 by testing H5, the idea that there is a direct positive effect of 
elections on corruption. We find that electoral regimes, without any other pieces of democracy 
included, are more corrupt, corroborating H5. In Model 2 in Table 4, we test H6 by allowing the 
Electoral Regime variable to hold a linear relationship with corruption and then adding only the 
linear Reduced Free and Fair Elections term. The result still holds. In line with H5, the mere 
introduction of elections as compared to closed authoritarian regimes is positively related to 
corruption. This, we argue, is one of the key explanations for the upward bend of the inverted J-
shaped relationship between electoral democracy and corruption. Then, controlling for whether 
elections are held, and in line with H6, election quality is negatively related to corruption, in line 
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with previous theorizing of the corruption-purifying effect of vertical accountability. This helps 
account for the downward bend of the inverted J. 
  
Table 4: Explaining the Relationship between Corruption and Electoral Democracy 
 (1) (2) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (1 Year) 1.0365*** 1.0346*** 
(0.0149) (0.0148) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (2 Years) -0.0615*** -0.0621*** 
(0.0151) (0.0151) 
Electoral Regime, Lagged (1 Year) 0.0031*** 0.0051*** 
(0.0010) (0.0013) 
Reduced Free and Fair Elections, Lagged (1 Year)  -0.0072** 
 (0.0028) 
R2 0.9537 0.9537 
No. Countries 173 173 
Avg. Years per Country 91.4 91.4 
No. Observations 15818 15812 
Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors clustered on countries, in parentheses. Country- and year-
fixed effects included in regressions but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
These findings from our hypothesis-testing remain consistent when the additional 
controls are added. This is evident from Table 2 in the supplemental appendix. 
We note that it is rare to see the same data source for both dependent and independent 
variables. The norm to avoid this practice is not unfounded. One might be concerned about a 
correlation in measurement error biasing the results of analysis. However, we emphasize four 
justifications. First, practically speaking, V-Dem’s coverage is unparalleled, so we cannot run the 
analysis with any other data. Second, the V-Dem measurement model is designed to improve 
cross-country comparability through bridging, lateral coding, and the use of anchoring vignettes. 
As cross-country differences are a likely primary driver of correlated measurement error, 
reducing these differences makes the V-Dem data less likely to be plagued by this threat. Third, 
it may not actually mitigate the issue to substitute in other expert survey data, as other experts 
may be subject to the same biases as V-Dem experts are, if not more so. For example, if we are 
concerned that the normative premium placed on democracy in the international community 
would bias coders to rate corruption in democratic countries lower, we do not necessarily think 
that V-Dem coders would be more subject to this bias than others. In fact, we suspect the 
opposite because most V-Dem coders study governance and politics and live in the countries 
they code; whereas other datasets on corruption and democracy rely heavily on foreigners, often 
businesspeople, rather than political experts. Nonetheless, we include models that use measures 
for our independent variables from data sources outside of V-Dem in Table 5 of the 
supplemental appendix. The results for democracy overall are generally robust to the 
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substitution of the variables for non-V-Dem data, as is the negative, linear, significant 
relationship between the quality of elections and corruption. The results for freedom of 
association, freedom of expression, judicial constraints on executive, and legislative constraints 
on executive are not robust when substituting non-V-Dem data, but this is likely due to the 
smaller sample size.  Reductions in sample size range from approximately 40 percent to more 
than 90 percent. 
Fourth, to directly deal with this concern in our analysis, we attempt to correct for this 
potential endogeneity bias by leveraging another special feature of the V-Dem data: the fact that, 
in most countries, different country-experts responded to different “surveys,” i.e. thematically 
grouped sets of questions. To the extent that the indicators tapping into corruption appear in 
other such surveys than the indicators tapping into the constructs measuring our six hypotheses, 
we can accordingly eliminate country experts responding to questions on both sides of the 
equation. When we do so, we find that our results, with the exception of the relationship 
between judicial constraints and corruption, are robust. These tests appear at the end of the 
supplemental appendix in Table 6.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we consider a puzzle that continues to perplex social scientists and practitioners: 
why do very high levels of democracy reduce corruption while low to modest levels of 
democracy actually increase corruption? There have been competing explanations, but previous 
research seeking to explain the puzzle had not disaggregated the complex concept of democracy. 
By disaggregating democracy theoretically and empirically, we shed light on the components of 
democracy that drive the curvilinear relationship with corruption. Most broadly, we theorize that 
specific components of democracy influence individuals’ calculations about the transaction and 
accountability costs and political support benefits of corruption and thus help determine 
corruption levels in countries. Specifically, we find that, collectively, certain components of 
democracy—the presence of elections, combined with whether they are free and fair, and 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and judicial constraints—are strongly associated 
with a curvilinear relationship between democracy and corruption. Freedom of expression and 
freedom of association each exhibit an inverse J-shaped curvilinear relationship with corruption. 
By contrast, the introduction of elections and the quality of elections each act in a linear 
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fashion—positively and negatively with corruption, respectively—but jointly form a curvilinear 
relationship. Judicial constraints exhibit a negative linear relationship with corruption.  
 This research has important theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, our 
findings underscore that it is not low levels of “democracy,” but rather specific democratic 
components that fuel corruption—namely the introduction of elections in the absence of 
ensuring they are free and fair, and low levels of freedom of expression and freedom of 
association. For policymakers, this is a hopeful finding in the sense that democratization does 
not have to result in greater corruption. Potentially through ordering of the introduction of 
democratic components and the strengthening of some components early in the democratization 
process, a proliferation of illicit activity can be avoided. The fact that even weak judicial 
constraints are associated with a decline in corruption is particularly promising. Finally, we 
should not lose sight of the reassuring finding that corruption levels are quite low once all 
democratic components are strong. In short, democratic responsiveness works.  
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Appendix 
 
List of Variables   
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Corruption Index: This is an index created from indicators of executive bribery, executive 
embezzlement, public sector bribery, public sector embezzlement, legislative corruption, and 
judicial corruption using Bayesian factor analysis.  This index was rescaled to vary between 0 and 
1 and to imply that higher values mean greater corruption. Project manager: Jan Teorell Source:  
V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  (v2x_corr)   
 
Executive Corruption:  The index is formed by taking the average of the point estimates from 
a Bayesian factor analysis model of indicators for executive bribery and executive embezzlement. 
This index was rescaled to vary between 0 and 1 and to imply that higher values mean greater 
corruption. Project manager: Jan Teorell.  Source:  V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  
(v2x_execorr) 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Electoral Democracy:  This index of democracy takes into account the extent of freedom of 
association, suffrage, clean elections, the election of the executive, and freedom of expression 
using V-Dem data. Project manager: Jan Teorell. Source:  V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  
(v2x_polyarchy)   
 
Electoral Regime: A country-year is coded as 1 if regularly scheduled national elections are on 
course and 0 if either the national election of the executive or parliament has been interrupted or 
prior to the first election in a country’s history. Project managers: Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan 
Teorell. Source:  V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  (v2x_elecreg) 
 
Freedom of Association: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian 
factor analysis model of indicators for party bans, barriers to parties, opposition parties’ 
autonomy, the extent to which elections are multiparty, civil society organization (CSO) entry 
and exit, and CSO repression. Project managers: Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell. 
Source:  V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  (v2x_frassoc_thick) 
 
Freedom of Expression: This index examines the extent to which government respects press 
and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in 
the public sphere, and the freedom of academic and cultural expression. Project managers: 
Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell. Source:  V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  (v2x_freexp_thick)   
 
Judicial Constraints on Executive: This index of V-Dem measures examines to what extent 
the executive abides by the constitution and court rulings and to what extent the judiciary acts in 
an independent fashion. Project manager: Jan Teorell. Source:  V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  
(v2x_jucon)   
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Legislative Constraints on Executive: This index of V-Dem measures examines to what 
extent are the legislature and government agencies, such as the comptroller general, able to 
question, investigate, and oversee the executive. Project manager: Jan Teorell. Source:  V-Dem, 
Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  (v2xlg_legcon) 
 
Reduced Free and Fair Elections: This index is formed by taking the point estimates from a 
principal components factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy, EMB capacity, 
voter registry, other voting irregularities, election government intimidation, electoral violence, 
and whether or not the election was generally free and fair. Departing from the higher-level free 
and fair elections index produced in V-Dem, we exclude vote buying. Project manager: Staffan 
Lindberg.  Source:  V-Dem, Coppedge, et al. 2016a.  (v2xel_frefair with v2elvotbuy removed)  
 
 Control Variables 
 
GDP per Capita: The natural log of gross domestic production divided by the population size. 
Source: Maddison 2010.  (e_migdppcln) 
 
Gini Coefficient: A measure of income inequality. Source:  UNU-Wider 2008.  (e_peginiwi) 
 
Media Freedom:  This variable is scored, in paraphrased language, as follows:  (0) Not possible 
to criticize the government or government officials; (1) Social, legal, or economic costs related to 
such criticisms; (2) Such criticisms are common.  The original scale was reversed, and the 
original categories “0” (No effective media) and “8” (missing data or social/political disruption makes it 
impossible to code) were set to missing. Source:  Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle 2015. (e_mefree) 
 
State Capacity: This variable is produced using Bayesian latent variables analysis on 24 different 
indicators of state capacity. Source: Hanson and Sigman 2013. (Capacity) 
 
Stock of Democracy: For this variable the value time t+1 is equal to the sum of the value of 
Electoral Democracy at time t+1 and time t, minus 10 percent of depreciation at time t.  
 
Trade Openness: Exports plus imports divided by real GDP per capita. Source: Maddison 
2010. Barbieri, et al. 2009. 
 
Note:  Where applicable, names of variables as they appear in the V-Dem dataset are given at the 
end of each entry. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Mean SD Min. Max. 
Corruption Index 0.439 0.264 0.009 0.946 
Executive Corruption 0.450 0.300 0.011 0.979 
Electoral Democracy 0.321 0.281 0.008 0.958 
Freedom of Expression 0.466 0.315 0.013 0.989 
Freedom of Association 0.468 0.332 0.022 0.968 
Judicial Constraints on Executive 0.516 0.290 0.005 0.992 
Legislative Constraints on Executive 0.467 0.304 0.023 0.987 
Electoral Regime 0.607 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Reduced Free and Fair Elections 0.293 0.335 0.000 0.989 
Stock of Democracy 2.705 2.518 0.012 9.430 
State Capacity, Hanson and Sigman 0.000 1.000 -3.512 2.862 
GDP per Capita, Maddison Project 4.441 5.370 0.203 42.916 
Gini Coefficient, UNU-WIDER 41.098 10.478 15.000 73.900 
Trade Openness 0.159 0.310 0.000 6.383 
Freedom House and Polity Index 5.389 3.454 0.000 10.000 
Democracy, UDS Mean Score 0.004 0.979 -2.112 2.263 
Democracy, Vanhanen 8.995 11.765 0.000 47.080 
Democracy, Boix 0.364 0.481 0.000 1.000 
Executive Electoral Competitiveness, DPI 5.209 2.154 1.000 7.000 
Freedom of Speech, EQIO 2.212 0.681 1.000 3.000 
Freedom of Association, EQIO 2.406 0.717 1.000 3.000 
Media Freedom, Whitten-Woodring and 
Van Belle 
0.741 0.846 0.000 2.000 
Oversight Powers, CCP 2.569 1.230 1.000 4.000 
Checks and Balances, Beck et al. 2.525 1.703 1.000 18.000 
Number of Observations 18655    
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Figure 1. Diagram of Control Variables 
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Table 2. Controls (next page) 
 
This table considers the same models we present in the paper, adding the four control variables we discuss in the paper but do not include in our 
main analyses: state capacity, GDP per capita, trade openness, GINI coefficient. Model 1 here is Model 4 from Table 1 in the paper with the control 
variables included. Model 2 here is that same model run without the control variables but on the same sample as in Model 1, showing that the loss of 
statistical significance is driven by the loss in observations, not by the introduction of control variables. The remaining models replicate the sequence 
of models in Tables 2-4 in the paper, with control variables included. 
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Table 3. Outliers  
 
Model 1 here is Model 4 in Table 1 in the paper. From this, we identified the points with high 
leverage and high squared residuals. This revealed five outliers: Vietnam in 1914, Tunisia in 2011, 
Georgia in 2004, Palestine in 2006, Palestine in 2007. To be conservative, we removed those in 
Model 2. The results are relatively unchanged. 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Corruption Index Corruption Index 
Corruption Index, Lagged (1 Year) 1.0366*** 1.0393*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0097) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (2 Years) -0.0810*** -0.0824*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0096) 
Electoral Democracy, Lagged (1 Year) 0.0147** 0.0140** 
   Year) (0.0072) (0.0070) 
Electoral Democracy^2 -0.0275*** -0.0264*** 
   Years (0.0085) (0.0082) 
Stock of Democracy, Lagged (1 Year) 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
GDP Per Capita, Lagged (1 Year) -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP Per Capita x Electoral Democracy 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
R2 0.9879 0.9887 
No. Observations 10208 10203 
Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors clustered on countries, in parentheses. Country- and year-fixed 
effects included in regressions but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4. Test of the S-curve with V-Dem Data 
 (1) 
 Corruption Index 
Corruption Index, Lagged (1 Year) 1.0361*** 
 (0.0169) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (2 Years) -0.0809*** 
 (0.0160) 
Corruption Index, Lagged (1 Year)  
  
Corruption Index, Lagged (2 Years)  
  
Electoral Democracy, Lagged (1 0.0392** 
   Year) (0.0191) 
Electoral Democracy^2 -0.0949** 
 (0.0475) 
Electoral Democracy^3 0.0511 
 (0.0349) 
Stock of Democracy, Lagged (1 Year) 0.0016*** 
 (0.0005) 
GDP Per Capita, Lagged (1 Year) -0.0003 
 (0.0004) 
GDP Per Capita x Electoral Democracy -0.0000 
 (0.0004) 
R2 0.9324 
No. Countries 154 
Avg. Years per Country 66.3 
No. Observations 10208 
Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors clustered on countries, in parentheses. Country- and year-
fixed effects included in regressions but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness Tests Using Non-V-Dem Data (next page) 
 
The table on the next page considers the same models we present in the paper, including non-V-
Dem measures of the independent variables. Here, Freedom House and Polity Index, Democracy UDS 
Mean Score, Democracy Vanhanen, and Democracy Boix provide substitutes for the V-Dem Electoral 
Democracy index. EQIQ provides a substitute for the V-Dem Freedom of Expression and Freedom of 
Association measures. Checks and Balances, Beck et al. provides a substitute for V-Dem’s Legislative 
Checks on Executive. Executive Electoral Competitiveness, DPI provides a substitute for the V-Dem 
Reduced Free and Fair Elections index. 
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List of Variables Appearing in Table 5:  
 
Freedom House and Polity Index: To create this index the average of Freedom House’s two 
scores are taken and are transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity is transformed to a scale 0-10, 
and then these are averaged. The scale for this index ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 is least 
democratic and 10 most democratic. Source: Freedom House (e_fh_polity2) 
 
Democracy, UDS Mean Score: The UDS are estimated using a Bayesian statistical 
measurement model and, therefore, can be used to make probabilistic statements about other 
useful quantities, such as the difference in democracy levels between two countries in a given 
year. The mean forming this measure is the posterior mean. Source: Pemstein et al. (2010) 
(e_uds_mean) 
  
Democracy, Vanhanen: This variable is created by multiplying Vanhanen’s Competition and 
Participation scores and dividing the resulting product by 100. Vanhanen’s Competition score 
measures opposition party vote shares. Vanhanen’s Participation score measures the percentage 
of population participating in elections. The resulting democracy scale varies from 0 to 50. 
Source: Vanhanen 2000 (e_mivanhan). 
 
Democracy, Boix: This variable provides a dichotomous measure of democracy based on 
contestation and participation. Contestation is determined by whether political leaders are 
selected through free and fair elections. Participation is determined by a minimum level of 
suffrage. Values are coded as 1 for a democracy and 0 for a non-democracy. Source: Boix, Miller, 
and Rosato 2013 (e_boix_regime) 
 
Oversight Powers, CCP: This variable provides an ordinal measure for executive oversight by 
the legislature. The main responses include: (1) the legislature can call on the executive to report 
as it sees fit; (2) the executive must report to the legislature at regular intervals; (3) both; and (4) 
neither. Source: Elkins et al. 2012 (e_ccp_intexec) 
 
Executive Electoral Competitiveness, DPI: This variable provides a dichotomous scale that 
measures if the executive is elected directly (1) or through an electoral college (2). Source: Beck 
et al. 2001 (e_dpi_eipc) 
 
Freedom of Association, EQIO: This variable provides an ordinal scale with three possible 
values: (1) citizens do not have freedom of association, (2) freedom of association exists with 
some problems, (3) citizens have freedom of association,. Source: Kelley and Kolev 2010 
(e_SF2) 
 
Freedom of Speech, EQIO: This variable provides an ordinal scale with three possible values: 
(1) citizens do not have freedom of speech, (2) freedom of speech exists with some problems, or 
(3) citizens have freedom of speech. Source: Kelley and Kolev 2010 (e_SF3) 
 
Checks and Balances, Beck et al.: This variable provides a measure for the number of veto 
players in the government, adjusted for the level of independence of each branch, party 
affiliation, and electoral rules. The scale ranges from 0 to 18. Source: Beck et al. (2001) 
(e_dpi_checks) 
 
Note:  Names of variables as they appear in the V-Dem dataset are given at the end of each 
entry.  
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Robustness Tests Using Non-Overlapping Coders (Table 6) 
 
As noted in the text, we attempt to correct for a potential endogeneity bias by leveraging 
in the V-Dem data the fact that, in most countries, different country-experts responded to 
different “surveys”, i.e. thematically grouped sets of questions. To the extent that the indicators 
tapping into corruption appear in other such surveys than the indicators tapping into the 
constructs measuring our six hypotheses, we can accordingly eliminate country experts 
responding to questions on both sides of the equation. Four of the corruption indicators appear 
in the executive survey, one in the legislative and one in the judicial survey, whereas all freedom 
of expression, freedom of association and clean elections indicators appear in distinct surveys 
(on elections, parties, civil society, civil liberties and the media). When testing the effects of 
judicial and legislative constraints, we accordingly construct a measure of corruption without the 
indicator from these surveys, respectively. Table 5 below then replicates the results in Tables 2-4 
in the text, with one model per hypothesis (except the fifth model which tests H5 and H6 
simultaneously), but on data where country experts appearing on both sides of the equation are 
being excluded. 
It should be noted however that these analyses preclude drawing on estimates from the 
V-Dem measurement model, which of course relies on data from all country experts responding 
to any indicator. We are instead forced to rely on simple averaging as the method of aggregating 
scores across country experts. No account is thus taken to potentially varying thresholds or 
lateral coding. With this caveat in mind, the results are fairly straight-forward. The most robust 
effects appear to be the ones for freedom of association (still significantly curvilinear) and free 
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and fair elections (still significantly positive for holding elections, significantly linearly negative 
for freedom and fairness). The squared term for freedom of expression is only marginally 
significant, and the additive term is not significant, so freedom of expression, when excluding 
coders appearing on both sides, mostly reduces corruption in a monotonically decreasing 
fashion. There is no significant result for judicial constraints, and a marginally significant but 
positive effect of legislative constraints (counter to the hypothesis). So, overall, when taking the 
precaution of excluding coders appearing on both sides of the equation, we find strongest 
support for H2, H5 and H6. . 
 
Table 6: Robustness Tests Using Non-Overlapping Coders 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Testing 
H1 
Testing 
H2 
Testing 
H3 
Testing 
H4 
Testing 
H5-H6 
Corruption Index, Lagged  .9454*** .5589*** .9734*** .9795*** .6041*** 
   (1 Year) (.0400) (.0340) (.0196) (.0278) (.0212) 
Corruption Index, Lagged  .0202 .3822*** –.0117 –.0377 .3267*** 
   (2 Year) (.0390) (.0324) (.0199) (.0227) (.0185) 
Freedom of Expression, Lagged  .0212     
   (1 Year) (.0135)     
Freedom of Expression^2 –.0224*     
 (.0131)     
Freedom of Association, Lagged   .0487***    
   (1 Year)  (.0115)    
Freedom of Association^2  –.0494***    
  (.0125)    
Judicial Constraints on    –.0020   
   Executive, Lagged (1 Year)   (.0038)   
Legislative Constraints on     .0160*  
   Executive, Lagged (1 Year)    (.0081)  
Electoral Regime, Lagged      .0089*** 
   (1 Year)     (.0024) 
Reduced F&F Elections,      –.0206*** 
   Lagged (1 Year)     (.0044) 
R2 0.9256 0.8435 0.9308 0.8911 0.8386 
No. Countries 132 169 169 89 169 
Avg. Years Per Country 59.5 83.2 83.0 43.1 76.8 
No. Observations 7859 14068 14032 3834 12983 
Entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors clustered on countries, in parentheses. Country- and year-
fixed effects included in regressions but omitted from the table. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
